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I. INTRODUCTION
With the exception of a relatively small number of relationships defined by
statute or custom, privacy2 is not mandated by default in the United States.3
* Laurie Silvers & Mitchell Rubenstein Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Miami. Copyright 02013. Permission is granted to re-use subject to the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License, http://creativecom
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/. This paper was inspired by Claudia Diaz's presentation
on European law's conflicts with PETs, Hero or Villain: The Data Controller in Privacy
Law and Technology, delivered at the Ohio State Law Journal's symposium on "The Second
Wave of Global Privacy Protection." See Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene & Seda Gdirses, Hero or
Villain: The Data Controller in Privacy Law and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 923 (2013).
I would like to thank Peter Swire and the editors of the Ohio State Law Journal for allowing
me to substitute this different-and more timely-essay for the one I presented at the
conference. Also, thanks to trakli Shalolashvili for research assistance, and to Caroline
Bradley, Peter Eckersly, and Lee Tien for helpful conversations. Unless otherwise noted, this
article seeks to reflect technical and legal developments up to Aug. 28, 2013. The update in
Part V seeks to reflect news reports up to Sept. 21, 2013.
1 E.g., attorney-client privilege. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4
(1978); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013).
2 For the purposes of this Article, I define privacy to mean informational privacy, and
more specifically the ability to control the release of information about oneself. This
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Thus, in almost all legal and social relationships, and in most of daily life, if one
wishes to keep something private as a legal matter, each of us in the United
States bears the responsibility to arrange our own affairs so that we achieve our
privacy goals. That state of affairs is itself no secret; it is regularly publicized,
and most people must by now be aware that if they care about their privacy they
must protect it. What is less well understood, however, is the extent to which
the law-and commercial practice also-actually imposes impediments to
privacy. This Article examines some of those impediments, particularly legal
rules and corporate policies that block (or seem likely in the near future to be
invoked to block) privacy self-help in the form of Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) and other privacy enhancing measures.4
PETs and other privacy enhancing measures are important because of
increasing private sector surveillance online and in daily life. Privacy
enhancement also seems particularly important now in light of recent
revelations regarding the United States government's systematic collection of
communications meta-data, and of at least some actual communications data.5
Corporate policies matter because in industries subject to concentration-
whether due to ordinary oligopoly or the network effects that frequently
characterize communications technologies-these private rules constrain
consumer choices much as do the legal rules. What is more, the two converge:
industry concentration provides an easy locus for regulation; alternately, the
threat of regulation can drive an industry to adopt rules and practices favoring a
government agenda.6 A government concerned with protecting personal privacy
and enhancing user security against ID theft and other fraud should support and
advocate for the widespread use of PETs. In fact, however, whatever official
definition is admittedly incomplete, but it has a pedigree, see e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7-12 (1967), and this is a short Article.
3 For a thoughtful discussion of why privacy by default makes sense, and the likely
consequences of making it the default, see Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?
(Aug. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2349766 (on file with author).
4 A standard definition of PETs is in G.W. VAN BLARKOM, J.J. BORKING & J.G.E. OLK,
HANDBOOK OF PRIVACY AND PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: THE CASE OF
INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE AGENTS 33 (2003), available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/
downloads technologie/pisa handboek.pdf.
5 See infra text following note 50.
6See infra text at notes 84-87 (discussing motivations for adoption of Trusted
Computing by chip makers); see also Declan McCullagh, How the US. Forces Net Firms To
Cooperate on Surveillance, CNET NEWS (July 12, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/
8301-13578 3-57593538-38/how-the-u.s-forces-net-firms-to-cooperate-on-surveillance/
(firms threatened with surveillance orders in order to secure "voluntary" compliance with
U.S. surveillance demands); Tom Simonite, Microsoft's Surveillance Collaboration:
Voluntary Aid, or New Legal Tactic?, MIT TECH. REV. (July 12, 2013), http://www.tech
nologyreview.com/news/517151 /microsofts-surveillance-collaboration-voluntary-aid-or-
new-legal-tactic/ (speculating as to motives for Microsoft's redesign of Outlook.com email
service in order to enable National Security Agency's PRISM surveillance program to
collect chat data before it was encrypted).
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policy may be, by its actions the prevailing attitude of the U.S. government
amounts to saying that PETs, and indeed other privacy protecting technology,
must be kept on a leash.
II. WHY CONSUMERS NEED PETS AND OTHER PRIVACY DEFENSES
During an average day most of us do things in the home. We move around
outside the home. We make phone calls on landlines or cell phones. Many of us
use the Internet to read or write, either on computers or, increasingly, on hand-
held devices. We engage in transactions online, in stores, or with service
providers such as doctors and lawyers. Each of these activities has varying
elements of privacy; increasingly, however, whether we want them to or not,
each of these activities generates extensive records available to different private
and public entities.
Maintaining one's privacy limits the extent to which others can use these
types of personal information-legally-to exercise various sorts of power
against one. The more that other people know, the more they may make
invidious judgments, practice price discrimination, target advertising, or engage
in other legal acts that one might prefer to avoid.7 Privacy also protects against
some illegal activities such as credit card fraud and identity theft.8 For some,
privacy may also be a good in itself.
Both the U.S. government and the U.S. national media have made it clear
that, in the main, privacy protection is a personal responsibility. Thus, for
example, the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assurance has
funded an illustrated guide for consumers on "Preventing Identity Theft,"9
which instructs consumers to avoid putting outgoing mail, especially bill
payments, in private mailboxes where it can be stolen, not to write account
numbers where they can be seen, to "[m]ake sure nobody is standing right
7 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation 31-34 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of
Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2013-27, 2013), available at papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2309703 (discussing likely harms consumers may suffer when
profiled by marketers and other corporations).
8 Identity theft-defined in these sources as including credit card fraud, which is
actually a less serious fraud than the assumption of an identity for other purposes also-is on
the rise. See Kate Rogers, One New Identity Theft Victim Every 3 Seconds in 2012,
FoxBusINEsS (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/02/20/
one-new-identity-theft-victim-every-3-seconds-in-2012/; Bob Sullivan, ID Theft on the Rise
Again: 12.6 Million Victims in 2012, Study Shows, NBCNEWS (Feb. 20, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/20/17022584-id-theft-on-the-rise-again-126-
million-victims-in-2012-study-shows?lite; Martha C. White, Study: 10,000 Identity Theft
Rings in U.S., TIME, Nov. 20, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/l1/20/study-10000-
identity-theft-rings-in-u-s/.
9 See NAT'L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, PREVENTING IDENTITY THEFT: A GUIDE FOR
CONSUMERS (July 2005), available at http://www.ncpc.org/cms-upload/prevent/files/IDthe
ftrev.pdf. The illustrations feature McGruff, the Crime Dog. The Justice Department's
funding is acknowledged on the copyright page.
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behind you when you're using an ATM", and not to "give out your credit card
number on the Internet unless it is encrypted on a secure site."10 Other helpful
suggestions include "examine your credit reports," "make sure no one is
listening" if giving out personal information on a cell phone in a public place,
"[s]hred all financial statements," "[m]inimize the number of identification and
credit cards you carry with you," "[u]se traveler's checks instead of personal
bank checks,"' "be alert," "[c]ommit all passwords to memory. Never write
them down," and "[g]ive out your Social Security number only when absolutely
necessary."' 2 A similar focus on self-defense characterizes other consumer-
oriented government publications, such as the FDIC's video, Don't Be an On-
Line Victim: How To Guard Against Internet Thieves and Electronic Scams.' 3
Official policy of some agencies, however, can be more nuanced, as can be seen
for example in the FTC's recent report on the use of Social Security Numbers
(SSNs).14 In contrast to the consumer-facing publications, the report suggests a
number of measures to reduce commercial requests for SSNs-and also more
consumer education in self-help.15
Similarly, both print and online media are replete with advice as to how
consumers should protect their privacy. Some of it is reasonably sophisticated.
For example, Forbes.com's 10 Incredibly Simple Things You Should Be Doing
To Protect Your Privacy advises using a proxy service such as Tor to mask IP
numbers when visiting web sites.' 6
In fact, however, the average person who wishes to preserve his or her
privacy has only a limited variety of actions available to choose from in order to
achieve any privacy objectives: alter one's daily behavior, contract for
additional privacy, or employ technological defenses. Each of these strategies
faces serious limitations, both practical and legal.
10 Id at 7.
11Id. at 8. Oddly the National Crime Prevention Council does not discuss the extra fees
required to purchase travelers checks, the float buying travelers checks gives banks (and the
lost interest it would cause consumers), nor the increasing unwillingness of merchants to
accept travelers checks as they become less and less common. See, e.g., Kerri Fivecoat-
Campbell, Death of the Traveler's Check, MSN MONEY (Mar. 8, 2011, 6:06 PM),
http://money.msn.com/saving-money-tips/post.aspx?post-6e42c77-ad8-4549-ae08-7aa58
800d3ea.
1 2 PREVENTING IDENTITY THEFT: A GUIDE FOR CONSUMERS, supra note 9, at 9.
I3 Don't Be an On-Line Victim: How To Guard Against Internet Thieves and Electronic
Scams, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/guard/index.html (last updated June
22, 2011); see also Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: IDENTITY THEFT AND YOUR SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBER 2-4 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-
05-10064.pdf; Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AND
CARD 11-12 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10002.pdf.
14 FED. TRADE COMM'N, SECURITY IN NUMBERS: SSNS AND ID THEFT 2-3 (Dec. 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/12/PO75414ssnreport.pdf.
15 See id. at 10 ("Conduct Outreach to Business and Consumers").16 Kashmir Hill, 10 Incredibly Simple Things You Should Be Doing To Protect Your
Privacy, FORBEs (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/08/23/10-
incredibly-simple-things-you-should-be-doing-to-protect-your-privacy/.
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A. Limits to Changing Daily Behavior
One's daily behavior has very great privacy consequences, only some of
which are under a person's control. For example, one can choose whether to
patronize businesses with CCTV cameras, whether or not to be on Facebook,
and what to post online if one chooses to be on Facebook. One can wrestle with
Facebook's ever-changing privacy settings. But any person living in a modem
industrialized country will find that there is only so much that even living in a
very privacy-conscious fashion can do. Cameras are often cleverly
camouflaged, and they are increasingly prevalent. 17 Whether or not one chooses
to be on Facebook, one cannot control what pictures other people might put on
Facebook and how they identify or tag them.
Short of hiding out in a cabin in the woods-with sufficiently dense year-
round foliage to foil overflights, drones, and satellites--or perhaps hiding
behind an ever-changing series of disguises, regularly changing pre-paid cell
phones and numbers, and paying for everything in cash, the tracked, surveilled,
examined, and analyzed life is now pretty much an unavoidable aspect of urban
and even rural life. Even in normal, non-hermetic life, the law imposes some
constraints on privacy. Increasingly one is required to identify oneself to use
mass transit-first airplanes, and now trains and perhaps buses.18 Searches to
enter federal buildings are now routine;19 random searches in other public
places are increasingly commonplace. 20 "Postal Service computers photograph
the exterior of every piece of paper mail that is processed in the United States
- about 160 billion pieces last year."21 And, ever since the Hiibel decision,22
states have had the power to compel anyone being investigated by the police to
identify themselves. Meanwhile, the private sector is increasingly deploying
17 For a cautionary tale based on the UK experience see Benjamin Goold, Ian Loader &
Ang6lica Thumala, The Banality of Security: The Curious Case of Surveillance Cameras, 53
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 977 (2013), available at http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/
2013/07/22/bjc.aztO44.full.pdf+html (noting both pervasiveness of CCTV in the UK and the
resulting desensitization of the public--or as they call it, the growing "banality" of CCTV).
18 See Passenger Identification, AMTRAK, http://www.amtrak.com/passenger-identifi
cation (last visited Nov. 8, 2013); Is an ID Required To Travel by Bus?, PETER PAN Bus
LINES (June 13, 2013, 3:43 PM), support.peterpanbus.com/entries/21699644-Is-an-ID-
required-to-travel-by-bus-; see also Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the
Machine: Does Airport Scanning Violate Privacy?, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263 (2013).
19 See Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Federal Buildings Become Real ID Zones,
CNET NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/Federal-buildings-become-real-id-
zones/2009-1028 3-6229133.html.
20 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that random
bag searches on N.Y.C. subway were reasonable).
21 Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html?smid=
pl-share.22 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 190-91 (2004).
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cameras to monitor the public, both as security cameras on private property23
and as part of mass tracking designed to feed "smart city" initiatives.
B. Limits to Contracting for Privacy
One major form of lost privacy comes in the form of the digital records left
by economic transactions. In theory, one ought to be able to contract with firms
for increased privacy. In practice, of course, most goods and services are
provided on mass-market terms in which the supplier provides a non-negotiable
standard form contract.24 The idea that in any but a negligible fraction of cases
one would be able to alter those terms by negotiation is laughable.
One might expect, however, that if there is a demand for privacy, then in a
capitalist economy firms would seek to differentiate themselves by competing
on privacy. And indeed, there are a small number of primarily online services
that market themselves as privacy-friendly. Thus, for example, DuckDuckGo
and Ixquick market themselves as privacy-friendly search engines. Indeed, as I
write this, Ixquick's home page calls itself "the world's most private search
engine." 25 Every search result has a small hyperlinked announcement running at
the top which reads "Giant US government Internet spying scandal revealed." 26
Ixquick returns the top ten results from multiple search engines and asserts that
it does not store any user data and that it uses https encryption by default.27 It
also boasts that because Ixquick is based in the Netherlands,
US jurisdiction does not apply to us, at least not directly. Any request or
demand from ANY government (including the US) to deliver user data, will be
thoroughly checked by our lawyers, and we will not comply unless the law
which actually applies to us would undeniably require it from us. And even in
that hypothetical situation, we refer to our first point; we don't even have any
user data to give. We will never cooperate with voluntary spying programs like
PRISM. 28
With these promises Ixquick attempts to distinguish itself from the larger
and more popular search engines, and especially from Google, the market
23 The spread of security cameras (aka CCTV) is an international phenomenon. See
generally Revisiting the Surveillance Camera Revolution: Issues of Governance and Public
Policy. Introduction to Part One of the Special Issue, 16 INFO. POLITY 297 (2011).
Surveillance in the United States is taking on a new, more intrusive, dimension with the
deployment of "smart city" and "urban informatics" initiatives. See, e.g., Steven E. Koonin,
Dir., Ctr. for Urban Sci. and Progress, The Promise of Urban Informatics (Aug. 2, 2013).24 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 82-98 (2013).
25 See IXQUICK, https://ixquick.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).2 6 See No PRISM No Surveillance. No Government Back Doors. You Have Our Word
on It, START PAGE, https://startpage.com/eng/prism-program-exposed.html (last visited June
27, 2013).
27 Id
281d.
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leader. Interestingly, for those seeking fuller search results, Ixquick offers a
service called Startpage in which it acts as an anonymizing intermediary
between the user and Google.29 Note, however, that if the government has direct
access to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and cell phone companies, it can
acquire copies of all search requests before they get to Ixquick or any other
search engine. Only if those requests are encrypted at the source, e.g. via SSL or
TLS, will the use of a foreign-based search engine provide much in the way of
security against dragnet wiretaps. And even then, that security is only as good
as the search engine provider's protection of its encryption keys. 30
The search engine market is, unfortunately, atypical: it is relatively easy to
run an Internet search provider from off-shore as the product is entirely virtual,
and the search engine industry is not heavily regulated (as compared to banks
for example). These conditions are not unique to search engines, but they are
true of only a subset of primarily Internet-related service industries, or
industries dealing in intangibles or in digitizable property.31 They do not apply
to economic transactions that involve the exchange of a physical good, or an in-
person service, or require the participation of a firm in a heavily regulated
industry. Nor does the competition argument work well in industries subject to
network effects32 or to any other economic forces that encourage concentration.
Regulation also plays a part in suppressing competition on privacy. United
States-based participants in heavily regulated industries such as banks and
securities trading could not offer substantially privacy-enhanced terms of
service even if they wished to; they have some small amount of flexibility on
the extent to which they share customer information with affiliated companies
or third parties, 33 but that is about it.34 Significant competition on privacy is not
possible because U.S. law imposes strict anti-privacy requirements on financial
29 See Privacy, START PAGE, https://www.startpage.com/eng/protect-privacy (last
visited Sept. 10, 2013).30 See Brett Wooldridge, Duck Duck Go: Illusion of Privacy, ETHER RAG (July 11,
2013), http://etherrag.blogspot.com/2013/07/duck-duck-go-illusion-of-privacy.html. Note
that several-but not all--of the critiques in this article only apply to U.S.-based search
engines.
31 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129, 129-54 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997)
(predicting, so far accurately, that "most regulation of tangible goods. . . will remain
unaffected by the Internet").
32 On network effects and competition, see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 93; Howard A.
Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 U. PA. L.
REv. 1663, 1682-84 (2013).
3 3 See M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20185, PRIVACY
PROTECTION FOR CUSTOMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION 1-3 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20185.pdf.
34See Fact Sheet 24: Protecting Financial Privacy: The Burden Is on You, PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/content/protecting-financial-priva
cy-burden-you (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
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services providers. Banks and brokers must "know their customers" 3 5 and must
report all transactions exceeding $10,000 to the federal government; some
money-moving entities must report transactions exceeding $2,500.36
Other rules sweep more broadly. For example the "third-party doctrine"
means that as soon as Alice allows another to know information about her-
including intermediaries such as her cell phone company or her bank-she has
effectively waived her Fourth Amendment rights to that information.37 In
United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor questioned the continuing validity of
the third-party doctrine, suggesting that:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial
or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and
the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. . . . I for
one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless
disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the
last week, or month, or year.3 8
Justice Sotomayor's concerns are well-taken, but pending any reform of the
third-party doctrine, the fact remains that anyone sending an unencrypted email
is in effect at the mercy of every intermediary in the possibly lengthy chain of
intermediaries if the government comes calling with a warrant-or even, it
seems, if it comes without one. 39 A number of laws, for example the Electronic
35 Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970).
36 See Genci Bilali, Know Your Customer-or Not, 43 U. TOL. L. REv. 319, 320-21
(2012) (surveying relevant laws and rules); Rosalie Rayburn, Suspicious-Transaction
Reporting Alarms Privacy Advocates, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 11, 2004, http://www.abqjour
nal.com/biz/160454business04-11-04.htm (relating to transactions over $2,500); see also
Ross Q. Panko, Banking on the USA PATRIOT Act: An Endorsement of the Act's Use of
Banks To Combat Terrorist Financing and a Response to Its Critics, 122 BANKING L.J. 99,
99-102 (2005) (endorsing requirements that banks share customer information with both law
enforcement and other banks if the person is suspected of illegal activity).
37 Perhaps the strongest defense of the third-party doctrine is Orin S. Kerr's The Case
for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561, 561-65 (2009). Kerr argues that the
third-party doctrine ensures the technological neutrality of the Fourth Amendment. Without
it, criminals could substitute a hidden third-party exchange for a previously public act. Kerr
also argues that the rule's (to me, Procrustean) simplicity is an important virtue. Id at 563.
38 Unites States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
39 That the United States' National Security Agency (NSA) has systematically been
capturing all or part of communications by millions of U.S. citizens and others has been
known since at least 2001. See Jewel v. NSA, Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
(N.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) (rejecting state secrets defense relating to alleged illegal NSA
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Communications Privacy Act,40 protect against communications intermediaries
snooping on private communications. Not everyone is law-abiding, however,
and as a result a privacy- and safety-conscious person needs to protect herself
against those intermediaries as best she can.
The privacy problem is every bit as great in the private sector. Whereas in
the '90s it might have been easy to argue that market forces would sort out the
privacy and anti-privacy policies of firms, leading firms to compete to be seen
as privacy-friendly or to position themselves along a spectrum of privacy by
offering policies that would distinguish them from their competitors, that
argument seems less plausible today for reasons that have little to do with
privacy itself. The past decade has witnessed a powerful market-driven shift
towards closure and centralization in both hardware (e.g. the iPhone) and
software (e.g. Facebook, Twitter).
Facebook is a leading example of this phenomenon. It is wildly popular,
and, at least for a time, seemed poised to become the center of a constellation of
applications that link to or from it, or rely on credentials that Facebook
provides.41 For most of its existence, however, Facebook has pursued policies
that require users to identify themselves uniquely.42 Facebook is dominant in
spying and permitting case to go forward on constitutional claims), available at
https://www.eff.org/node/74895; NSA Spying on Americans, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying (describing discovery of AT&T cooperation with illegal
NSA surveillance). As this is being written, revelations continue to emerge about the
alleged, and at times admitted, program of warrantless wiretapping by the NSA. In re
Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (approving order requiring
telecommunications service provider to assist in warrantless surveillance of persons
"reasonably believed" to be outside United States); James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA
Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for US Citizens' Emails and Phone Calls, GUARDIAN,
Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-
searches-email-calls (warrantless acquisition of communications of U.S. persons). For an
early discussion of some of the legal issues see Blake Covington Norvell, The Constitution
and the NSA Warrantless Wiretapping Program: A Fourth Amendment Violation?, 11 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 228 (2009).
40 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
41 Caroline McCarthy, Amid Unrest, a Hard New Look at Online Anonymity, CNET
(Feb. 22, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577 3-20034879-36.html; see also
James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1146 (2009) ("Facebook's
most technologically interesting feature is its 'Platform,' which developers can use to create
'Applications' that plug seamlessly into the Facebook site."). But see Hamish McKenzie,
Move Fast, Break Things: The Sad Story of Platform, Facebook's Gigantic Missed
Opportunity, PANDODAILY.COM (July 23, 2013), http://pandodaily.com/2013/07/23/move-
fast-break-things-the-sad-story-of-platform-facebooks-gigantic-missed-opportunity/ (arguing
that Facebook failed to exploit potential of its Platform and thus allowed Apple iOS and
Google's Android to become the dominant platforms for apps).
42 Data Use Policy: Information We Receive About You, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) ("When you sign up for
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size, but by no means unique: many other social networks also require users to
use their real names. Google+, a recent entrant to social networking, requires
participants to "use the name your friends, family, or co-workers usually call
you," or "the name that you commonly go by in daily life"-a policy that has
been subject to substantial criticism.43
Firms, Google chief among them, seek to monetize user-generated content
in a variety of ways that often (although not inevitably) require the
identification of the user at least with a persistent token such as a cookie or
something similar,44 if not their actual name. Thus, for example, business
models that rely on serving targeted advertising need to know relevant facts
about the target's tastes and habits, and also may want to know what ads have
already been seen in order to avoid repetition. A "persistent token" may sound
innocuous, but if any application that uses the token links to the user's real
identity, or even in some cases his geo-location, the token becomes an effective
identification technology. Similar risks apply to users of many current cloud-
based services. 45
In each of these cases, leading firms in their industry have chosen to require
user self-identification as the price of access to their highly desirable network.
No government regulation was involved. We have known for some time that the
U.S. government was well aware that banks and other financial service
providers, ISPs, telecommunications providers and other key market
participants, were effective chokepoints for transactions flows and
communications. Indeed the U.S. government relies on these chokepoints as
targets for regulation aimed at end-users. With recent revelations about the
NSA, we are only now learning that the U.S. government also used these same
Facebook, you are required to provide information such as your name, email address,
birthday, and gender.").
43 See Identity Woman (Kaliya Hamlin), Google+ and My "Real" Name: Yes, I'm
Identity Woman, IDENTITYWOMANNET (July 31, 2011), http://www.identitywoman.net/
googlereal-name-identity-woman; see also Kee Hinckley, On Pseudonymity, Privacy and
Responsibility on Google+, GOOGLE PLUS (July 27, 2011), https://plus.google.com/ll179
03011098040166012/posts/asuDWWmaFcq (canvassing, and refuting, various arguments
against online pseudonymity and anonymity in light of Google+ decision).
44 These are collectively known as "local shared objects." See Local Shared Objects-
"Flash Cookies," ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (July 21, 2005), https://epic.org/pri
vacy/cookies/flash.html. For an extensive discussion of other forms of electronic
identification see Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic
Identity Intermediaries: The "Soft elD" Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335 (2013).
4 5 See Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 361-
63 (2009) (noting that because cloud services store content remotely, unless the content is
encrypted the "cloud"-based location becomes another possible target for government
surveillance without the user's knowledge).
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chokepoints as a way to accomplish direct data acquisition about the activities
of the intermediaries' customers. 46
C. Technological Counter-measures
If neither behavioral nor contractual privacy-protective measures can in fact
safeguard personal privacy, we would expect privacy-minded persons to turn to
technology, especially when the technology offers privacy-enhancing tools that
require neither changing one's daily habits nor attempting to negotiate contracts
in the face of standard forms. These privacy enhancing tools range from simple
things like drawing the curtains at home to much more exotic techniques
designed to make it more difficult, even sometimes impossible, for others to
capture data about personal actions and communications. For example, in order
to foil CCTV, a person might dress in "stealth wear," clothing designed to
protect against surveillance,47 or might employ a laser designed to blind spy
cameras.48 Privacy-protective technical means employed online and on cell
phones are often known as Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). PETs have
been defined as "a system of [Information Communication Technology]
measures protecting informational privacy by eliminating or minimizing
personal data thereby preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of
personal data, without the loss of the functionality of the information system."49
In 2007 the European Commission recommended that PETs "should be
developed and more widely used, in particular where personal data are
processed through information and communication technology (ICT)
networks."50 This Article concerns both PETs fitting the established definition,
and also a related group of "privacy-protecting technologies." The super-set of
46 See Barton Gellman & Todd Lindeman, Inner Workings of a Top-Secret Spy
Program, WASH. PosT, June 29, 2013, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/
inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/; Jonathan Stray, FAQ: What You Need To
Know About the NSA's Surveillance Programs, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2013),
https://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collection-faq.
47 See Jenna Wortham, Stealth Wear Aims To Make a Tech Statement, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/technology/stealth-wear-aims-to-make-
a-tech-statement.html?smid-pl-share.
48 See Loz Blain, Anti-paparazzi Lasers Being Fitted to the World's Biggest Private
Yacht, GIZMAG (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.gizmag.com/worlds-biggest-yacht-eclipse-
roman-abramovich-anti-paparazzi-laser/12912/; How To ZAP a Camera: Using Lasers To
Temporarily Neutralize Camera Sensors, MICHAEL NAIMARK (Oct. 2002), http://www.nai
mark.net/projects/zap/howto.html. Note that under U.S. law deploying a laser in this fashion
likely would be illegal, and certainly so if the laser were to cause any damage to equipment
or persons.
49 VAN BLARKOM, BORKING & OLK, supra note 4, at 33.
50 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on Promoting Data Protection by Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, COM (2007) 228 final
(May 2, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/legislationsummaries/informationsociety/
dataprotection/ll14555_en.htm.
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privacy-protecting technologies (PPT) includes PETs and also technologies that
protect privacy but do not necessarily protect "the functionality of the
information system"-rather, they intentionally impede systems designed to
collect data in some manner. As discussed in the next section, however, many
U.S. laws and industry rules make using many PPTs difficult or impossible.
III. ARE PETs ALLOWED?
U.S. law contains a number of provisions unfriendly to privacy, and the
current administration seems to want more-not to mention the administration's
role in the secret surveillance and data retention practices now coming to light.
In addition, key communications intermediaries and key hardware
manufacturers have chosen to make technological privacy self-help difficult or
in some cases nearly impossible. Some of these private choices flow from legal
rules or the fear of legal liability, but others appear to be primarily commercial
decisions.
U.S. rules and big-firm practices limiting privacy technologies can be
organized into four broad groups. The largest set of rules exist to ensure that
users of private communications technologies are easily wiretapped or
otherwise surveilled, in order to further the intelligence-gathering aims of the
government, whether in service of national security agencies or of more
ordinary law enforcement. These are discussed in Part III.A below.
A second, also substantial, set of rules consists of mandatory identification
policies, some imposed by law, other by major communications intermediaries.
These policies, surveyed in Part III.B, range widely across the law reflecting
their divergent motivations; the detection of money laundering, terrorism
financing, and other fraud is a notable sub-group.
A third group, discussed in Part III.C, places limits on hardware or software
in order to serve some end such as reducing the likelihood of copyright
infringement. As one common means of limiting both hardware and software
involves embedding a unique identifier that the user cannot (or, if it is
sufficiently obscure, is highly unlikely to) change, there is a degree of overlap
between this category and mandatory ID policies.
The fourth, even more heterogeneous, group (Part III.D) encompasses rules
that exist for reasons entirely independent of privacy or identity, but which
suppress a particular privacy enhancing or privacy-protective technology more
or less as an incident to the rule's primary purpose. For example, the tort rule
that makes taking or harming another's property does not exist to limit privacy
self-help, but it likely would make it a tort to use some anti-camera
technologies.
A. Mandating Surveillance-Friendly Technology and Data Retention
U.S. law includes several provisions designed to provide access to private
communications for intelligence agencies and law enforcement. Some of these
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rules, such as the court-ordered warrant allowing the monitoring of a suspect's
communications, have ancient roots and are largely uncontroversial. Similarly,
the rule allowing the installation of a pen register with a lesser court order52 is
also relatively uncontroversial-at least in its traditional application to
telephony.
Examples of more controversial rules include the third-party doctrine
mentioned above 53 and the requirement in the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 54 that telecommunications companies update
their equipment to provide extensive built-in surveillance capabilities, allowing
law enforcement agencies to monitor up to 20% of subscribers' transmissions in
real time.55
Despite these and many other (overt) surveillance capabilities provided by
law, the current administration appears unsatisfied. In 2011 the Obama Justice
Department asked Congress to enact data retention legislation in the United
States. 56 Later that year, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a wide-ranging data retention bill, labeling it the
"Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011."57 The proposal
would require every "provider of an electronic communication service or a
remote computing service" to retain the temporarily assigned network addresses
the service assigns to each account for at least eighteen months, as well as
account information about the customer.58 As for the security aspects of this
data, the proposed bill stated-non-bindingly-that "[i]t is the sense of
Congress . . . that records retained pursuant to section 2703(h) of title 18,
United States Code, should be stored securely to protect customer privacy and
prevent against breaches of the records." 59 That said, the text then goes on to
state that the covered providers shall have no liability for any disclosure of the
51 A pen register is a means of recording the phone numbers called by a phone line
being monitored and the length of the conversation, but does not give access to the content
of the communication. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979) (comparing pen
register to full wiretap).
52 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1851 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
53 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
5447 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012).
55 See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SC. &
TECH. L. REV. 416, 421-24 (2012), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=13
&article=9.
56 Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography and Other
Internet Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of
the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6-7 (2011) (statement of Jason Weinstein,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Weinstein01252011 .pdf.
57See H.R. REP. No. 112-281, pt. 1, at 2 (2011).
58 See id. (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2703); see also Declan McCullagh, House Panel
Approves Broadened ISP Snooping Bill, CNET NEWS (July 28, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://news.
cnet.com/8301-31921 3-20084939-281 /house-panel-approves-broadened-isp-snooping-bill/.
59 H.R. REP. No. 112-281, at 2.
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information.60 Alarmingly, the statute also permits non-judicial "administrative
subpoenas" by the U.S. Marshals service, albeit limiting that new power to
investigations of "an unregistered sex offender." 61
More recently, the Obama Administration floated "CALEA II," a proposal
that some or all cell phone application providers should be subject to CALEA
rules requiring them to be "wiretap friendly." 62 Ironically-in light of
subsequent revelations of NSA data collection-the FBI argued that it was
"going dark," that is, losing the ability to wiretap every conversation.63
Presumably the FBI's concern was with applications such as RedPhone, which
allows Android phone users to have an encrypted phone conversation 64 (in my
experience, at the cost of some call quality) via a so-called "endpoint to
endpoint" encryption. According to an eminent group of cryptographers who
critiqued the FBI proposal, its effects not only would be largely ineffective, but
would create serious security risks for users of endpoint-to-endpoint encryption
tools.65
The United States' publicly acknowledged privacy-unfriendly rules may,
alas, be no more than the tip of the iceberg. In addition to the public face of
drift-net surveillance, U.S. (not to mention non-U.S.) persons face the specter of
secret surveillance. If recent revelations about the NSA are accurate,66 at the
same time as the Obama Administration was asking for additional data retention
authority, it was secretly asserting that it already had all the legal authority
needed to demand that ISPs and cell phone companies turn over a substantial
amount of data about their customers' communications-the "metadata"
recording who phoned, messaged, or emailed whom, where, and for how long.67
Whether, and to what extent, phone and message traffic content is or was
warehoused or analyzed remains unclear, although it appears to include e-mails,
Internet telephony, and Internet video.68 There is also a report that the NSA
stores the full content of telephone calls. 69 In any case, we do know that in at
601d at 3.6 1 Id. at 4.
6 2 See BEN ADIDA ET AL., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., CALEA II: RISKS OF
WIRETAP MODIFICATIONS TO ENDPOINTS 2 (May 17, 2013), available at https://www.cdt.
org/files/pdfs/CALEAII-techreport.pdf.63 Id.
64 See RedPhone, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
org.thoughtcrime.redphone&hl=en (last visited Aug. 10, 2013).65 See ADIDA ET AL., supra note 62, § 3, at 4-7.66 See Greenwald, supra note 46; see also supra note 39.67 For a summary of what was known at the time this was written see Gellman &
Lindeman, supra note 46; Stray, supra note 46.68 Gellman & Lindeman, supra note 46.
69 See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, New Details Show Broader NSA
Surveillance Reach: Programs Cover 75% ofNation's Traffic, Can Snare Emails, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 20, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873241082045790228740
91732470.html (attributing information to interviews with "current and former officials");
Kevin Gosztola, Glenn Greenwald's Speech to the Socialism Conference [with Transcript],
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least some cases the NSA shared data with domestic law enforcement agencies
when it collected evidence of a crime. 70
Persons seeking to protect their privacy in this environment can either stop
using the technologies being surveilled-hardly a practical option for many--or
can try to protect their communications by technical means such as
encryption.71 U.S. export control policy, however, has the not-unintended effect
of discouraging equipment and software manufacturers from building
meaningful encryption into their products.72 At present, the major email
programs, the major video conference programs, and all mass-market cellphone
handsets, default to sending messages without encryption. While it is possible
for a determined user to add in encryption, 73 at least in my experience it is not
easy to configure encryption software well, and in any case it only works if the
person you are communicating with uses a compatible product.
B. Mandatory Identification
One particularly effective way for a person to safeguard his or her privacy
is to remain anonymous. By remaining anonymous a person ensures that his or
her communications, transactions, and movements cannot be linked to their
author-and perhaps not even to each other. Unfortunately for anyone hoping to
stay anonymous, many U.S. legal rules, and also many corporate policies in the
ICT sector, make it difficult to be anonymous.
Financial intermediaries must, as noted above, verify their customers'
identities, 74 which has the effect of tying online transactions to an identity (as
distinguished from an in-person cash transaction or, perhaps, a Bitcoin
transaction).75 Anti-anonymity rules extend far beyond transactions. In order to
DISSENTER (June 29, 2013, 9:47 AM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/06/29/glenn-
greenwalds-speech-to-the-socialism-conference-with-transcript (quoting Glenn Greenwald
referring to unpublished NSA document).
70 Kim Zetter, 5 Fun Facts from the Latest NSA Leak, WIRED (June 20, 2013, 6:04
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/06/five-fun-facts-on-the-nsa-leak/.
71 Cf Pete Ashdown, The NSA and XMission, TRANSMISSION (June 10, 2013),
https://transmission.xmission.com/2013/06/1 0/the-nsa-and-xmission (ISP operator's
statement that "[t]he Internet was built on trust, and nobody anticipated interception of data
would be a problem. The only way to fix this is through encryption." (emphasis omitted)).
72 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 748-51 (1995) [hereinafter Froomkin,
Metaphor]; A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow," 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 15, 43-50 [hereinafter Froomkin,
Planet Clipper].
73 E.g., OpenPGP Encryption for Webmail, MAILVELOPE, http://www.mailvelope.com/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (for Gmail users).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
75 Bitcoin is an anonymous online e-payment mechanism. Bitcoins are on the
borderline of U.S. anti-money-laundering law. The U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) classifies users of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin as
outside the definition of a "money services business" (MSB) and thus not subject to know-
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provide more precise location information to 911 dispatchers, cell phone
companies are required to fix the location of cell phone users at all times to
within 150 meters.76 The location of cell phone users becomes a private record
held by the cell phone service provider, discoverable and perhaps even routinely
obtained by the government, 77 and cell phone companies are forbidden from
competing to provide a more private, if perhaps less ambulance-ready,
service. 78
As the need for privacy-enhanced communications increases, and as email
and computer-mediated phone and video become increasingly significant means
of communication, the computer hardware on which those communications take
place is less and less hospitable to strong privacy. Delineating the role of U.S.
law in this evolution requires a short detour into intellectual property law
because copyright protection has been a significant motivation for this shift.
General-purpose computers, and increasingly other media-players, make digital
copying easy. In an attempt to protect copyright holders, Congress enacted the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Among its provisions, the DMCA
criminalizes making available technologies whose primary purpose and
function are to circumvent content protection technologies. 79 As a result, copy-
protection measures, notably "digital rights management" (DRM) technologies,
your-customer regulations. On the other hand, FinCEN treats Bitcoin brokers who exchange
Bitcoins for cash as subject to know-your-customer and other rules. See DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-GO01, APPLICATION OF
FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutesregs/guidance/pdf/
FIN-2013-G001.pdf. The extent to which Bitcoin protects identity against a government is
debatable. Apparently, "an agency with subpoena power would be well placed to identify
who is paying money to whom" in the Bitcoin network. Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of
Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names 2 (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/-smeiklejohn/files/imcl3.pdf.
76911 Service, 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.18(b), (h)(2)(i) (2012). See generally Recent
Development, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of
Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004).
77The U.S. government denied that the United States requires cell phone providers to
turn over all the location information providers have on their customers. See Matt Pearce,
NSA Does Not Collect Cellphone Location Data, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-nsa-phone-location-data-20130624
,0,6266092.story. The denial came hedged with enough evasions and caveats to make
surveillance experts suspicious. See id; cf Jameel Jaffer & Brett Max Kaufman, How To
Decode the True Meaning of What NSA Officials Say, SLATE (July 31, 2013, 5:29 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/politics/2013/07/nsa-lexicon howjames_
clapper and_other_u_s officials misleadthe american.html ("When it comes to discussing
government surveillance, U.S. intelligence officials have been using a vocabulary of
misdirection-a language that allows them to say one thing while meaning quite another.").
78 C( 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (requiring that providers report location of cell phone users
making 911 calls at a required degree of accuracy).
79 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103(a), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202, 1204 (2012).
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acquired legal protection from circumvention.80 The legal protection of DRM is
significant to privacy protection because DRM exists to distinguish between
authorized users of content (who have presumably purchased or otherwise
acquired a license) and other, unlicensed, users. Thus, in order to access a work,
the user must present a digital license-one that is usually unique, and
frequently traceable to the user.81 From the copyright-holder's perspective,
DRM provides a short-term advantage but carries the risk of long-term
vulnerabilities, notably that if the DRM scheme is ever broken-e.g. reverse
engineered so that users can trick it into believing they are authorized-there is
little if anything that can be done to again secure copies now vulnerable to
copying and unlicensed use. Furthermore, there was and is every reason to
believe that real-life DRM will be broken.82 The DMCA sought to fill this gap
by making it illegal to share the tools which could be used to unlock DRM-
protected content. 83 In so doing, however, it also made it illegal to share tools
that might allow users of DRM-protected content to use their licensed content
without having to identify themselves.
A similar progression is under way in hardware. Under the so-called
"Trusted Computing" initiative, chip-makers are placing unique identifiers on
computer chips that can be invoked by software to identify the machine, without
the knowledge or consent of the user.84 Intel's latest generation of chips, Sandy
Bridge, includes a unique identifier (they call it the "Intel Insider") just waiting
for software-not necessarily under the control of the user-to identify it.85 The
hope, not yet realized, is that having this capability will give more content
providers the courage to stream top-quality movies online because they can
encrypt it in a way that only a chip equipped with a unique identifier will be
able to decrypt. 86 Of course, every Internet-connected device already has a
80 See Bill D. Herman, A Political History of DRM and Related Copyright Debates,
1987-2012, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 162, 180-81 (2012).
81 See, e.g., DRM Individualization, MICROSOFr (June 12, 2013), http://msdn.micro
soft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/dd757083%28v=vs.85%29.aspx.
82See Bruce Schneier, The Futility ofDigital Copy Prevention, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSL.
(May 15, 2001), http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#3.
83 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
84By 2006 most major computer manufacturers were shipping systems that included
Trusted Platform Modules support although in many cases the user could turn them on or off
in the BIOS. Trusted Platform Module, NOVARA (Mar. 26, 2006), http://www.novara-
software.com/windows-vista/lista-da-evitare.php. These modules are in most computers sold
today. See Cory Doctorow, The Coming Civil War over General Purpose Computing,
BOINGBOING (July 2012), http://boingboing.net/2012/08/23/civilwar.html.
85See Richard Adhikari, Intel Builds Sandy Bridge with a DRM Tollbooth,
TECHNEWSWORLD (Jan. 4, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/71568
.html?wlc=1315966732; Nick Knupffer, Intel Insider-What Is It? (Is It DRMP And Yes It
Delivers Top Quality Movies to Your PC), TECHNOLOGY@INTEL BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://blogs.intel.com/technology/201 1/01/intel insider - what is it-no.php.
86Brooks Barnes, In This War, Movie Studios Are Siding with Your Couch, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/business/26steal.html. This
technology was designed to "control users and limit the abilities of computers." Chad
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unique MAC number, which also can be used to uniquely identify devices, but
these are usually part of a peripheral device. It is easier to replace or mask a
peripheral than it is to change or mask something hardwired on the CPU.87
There is no hardware equivalent to the DMCA; chip makers are deploying
the "Trusted Computing" project without the spur of a direct legal mandate. Part
of the motivation may be the belief that consumers will prefer devices that may
be able to access a wider variety of content.88 Another motivation, however,
appears to have been the manufacturers' fear that unless they deployed
something designed to prevent unlicensed copying, Congress would impose on
them something akin to the DMCA. 89 Law can thus cast a shadow on privacy-
enhancing technology even when it is only hypothetical. As a consequence of
the technological choices of hardware and software manufacturers, the
DMCA's protection of DRM against circumvention results in disempowering
the user. One consequence of those technologies is that if users want to do
certain things with their machines-play popular movies for example-they are
not able to install tools that protect their privacy against metering and
monitoring by the firms using DRM.
As Jonathan Zittrain has noted, primarily commercial concerns can suffice
to motivate architectural choices that centralize control over user behavior.90
Take, for example, Apple's decision to allow the iPhone to run only Apple-
approved software. On the one hand, this strong "curation" will tend to protect
users from malicious applications such as Trojan horses and viruses. On the
Woodford, Comment, Trusted Computing or Big Brother? Putting the Rights Back in Digital
Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 253, 280 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Ryan
Roemer, Locking Down Loose Bits: Trusted Computing, Digital Rights Management, and
the Fight for Copyright Control on Your Computer, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 4-6.
87 See, e.g., How To Change a MAC Address, TECH-FAQ, http://www.tech-
faq.com/how-to-change-a-mac-address.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2012). Interestingly, the
default behavior in Windows 7 is to use a randomized substitute for the MAC address. See
Scott Hogg, Windows 7 IPv6 Support, NETWORK WORLD (Jan. 29, 2009, 11:15 AM),
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/37947. This option is permitted by T.
NARTEN ET AL., RFC 4941, PRIVACY EXTENSIONS FOR STATELESS ADDRESS
AUTOCONFIGURATION IN IPv6 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4941.txt,
but has not been widely adopted elsewhere. In contrast, the current versions of Apple iOS
and Android are shipping with privacy extensions turned off. See IPv6: Smartphones
Compromise Users' Privacy, H SECURITY (Jan. 14, 2011, 2:41 PM), http://www.h-
online.com/security/news/item/lPv6-Smartphones-compromise-users-privacy-l 169708.html.
I am indebted to CDT Chief Computer Scientist Alissa Cooper for this information.
8 8 See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted
Systems, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1251, 1257-58 (2000) (discussing but rejecting claim that
consumers will benefit from technological copyright controls); Fred Koenigsberg, The Fifth
Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture: Humpty-Dumpty in Copyrightland, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 677, 687-88 (2004) (endorsing view that "in the long run the
general public will be the heaviest loser if copyright is weakened" (citation omitted)).8 9 See Roemer, supra note 86, at 57.
9 0 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How To STOP IT 10 1-26
(2008).
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other hand, it also prevents the iPhone's user from installing any privacy
enhancing software not approved by Apple.
In the United States, the government has not sought to make anonymity
illegal or to require online identification directly. Indeed, a legal requirement
that persons identify themselves online would not only be controversial but
would likely be unconstitutional.91 Most Internet and also cell phone
communications originate from devices that are linked to a user by the service
provider; access control and identification are required for billing purposes and
out of fear that unidentified persons might hack or otherwise harm the system.
Identification is thus something of a default for commercial reasons, and for
security reasons, even in non-profit settings.92 As the United States has no
European-style Data Protection Directive to act as a counterweight to the
private retention of data, the users' needs for a technological defense against
being identified and profiled is even more acute and the issue is to what extent
users will remain able to use privacy-protecting technologies to change the
default and mask their identity. On this question, the U.S. government appears
to be pursuing contradictory policies, some of which might enhance anonymous
communication while others seem calculated to make it difficult or impossible.
The Commerce Department's National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace93 epitomizes one side of the division. The Strategy envisions an
"Identity Ecosystem" described as a system that will enhance privacy and civil
liberties:
The Identity Ecosystem will use privacy-enhancing technology and policies to
inhibit the ability of service providers to link an individual's transactions, thus
ensuring that no one service provider can gain a complete picture of an
individual's life in cyberspace. By default, only the minimum necessary
information will be shared in a transaction. For example, the Identity
Ecosystem will allow a consumer to provide her age during a transaction
without also providing her birth date, name, address, or other identifying data.
In addition to privacy protections, the Identity Ecosystem will preserve
online anonymity and pseudonymity, including anonymous browsing. 94
While setting out the outlines of how such a system might work in theory,
the Strategy does not attempt to explain key aspects of how its ambitious goals
might be attained in practice. Instead it sets out a ten-year roadmap, in which
91 See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and the Law in the United States, in LESSONS
FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY
441, 442-47 (Ian Kerr ed., 2009).
92 Fear of spammers using resources to send large numbers of messages is one such
fear. The spain not only can strain the network, but can cause recipient networks to blacklist
the sending organization, thus further interfering with legitimate traffic.
9 3 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE:
ENHANCING ONLINE CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511 .pdf.
941d. at 2.
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the first three to five years require "standardization of policy and technology."9 5
The key to implementations, we are told, rests on the twin pillars of underlying
reliable offline credentials 96 and private-sector leadership:
Ultimately, the Identity Ecosystem can only be designed and built by the
private sector. The Federal Government will support the private sector, ensure
that the Identity Ecosystem respects the privacy and otherwise supports the
civil liberties of individuals, and be a leader in implementing the Identity
Ecosystem in its own services. Existing efforts by the public and private
sectors have already established services that are significant components of the
Identity Ecosystem, but much remains to be done. Individuals, businesses,
non-profits, advocacy groups, associations, and all levels of government must
work in partnership to improve how identities are trusted and used in
cyberspace. 97
Only one month later, however, the White House released its International
Strategy for Cyberspace, a document that while it also extolled the Internet's
benefits and opportunities, warned darkly of its dangers:
Extortion, fraud, identity theft, and child exploitation can threaten users'
confidence in online commerce, social networks and even their personal safety.
The theft of intellectual property threatens national competitiveness and the
innovation that drives it. These challenges transcend national borders; low
costs of entry to cyberspace and the ability to establish an anonymous virtual
presence can also lead to "safe havens" for criminals, with or without a state's
knowledge. Cybersecurity threats can even endanger international peace and
security more broadly, as traditional forms of conflict are extended into
cyberspace. 98
Rather than commit to protecting anonymity, this policy document
suggested that while privacy was important, the main goals were notice and the
active role of government to protect users from evils while subject to "judicial
review and oversight." 99 Thus, the Internet of the future should be "secure"-in
the sense of not allowing bad actors free rein, rather than in the sense of
951d at 40.96 Id at 8 ("The Strategy does not explicitly address identity and trust issues in the
offline world; however, offline and online identity solutions can and should complement
each other. Identity proofing (verifying the identity of an individual) and the quality of
identity source documents have a profound impact on establishing trusted digital identities,
but the Strategy does not prescribe how these processes and documents need to evolve."
(emphasis omitted)).
97 1d. at 43.
9 8 THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY,
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 4 (2011), available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/internationalstrategyfor cyberspace.pdf.
99 Id at 5.
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fostering communications free from third-party monitoring or accountability. 00
Fundamental values of freedom of expression and privacy (defined as freedom
from "arbitrary or unlawful" state action) would be balanced against "respect
[for] intellectual property rights" and "protection from crime."101
C. Technology-Limiting Rules
As the International Strategy for Cyberspace demonstrates, U.S. policy
typically treats privacy as a value to be traded off against other benefits, notably
safety and security. This is particularly evident in regards to ICT privacy, but
also applies more generally. A concern with safety, perhaps leavened with some
solicitude for liability in accident cases, led the National Highway Safety
Administration to propose a rule requiring event vehicle recorders (also known
as "black boxes") in all cars; if the rule becomes final, car makers will not be
able to compete on driver privacy.102
As noted above, cell phones report fine-grained user location;103 firms want
access to this information in order to know exactly where their potential
customers are and what they are looking at, a desire being filled by systems
such as the Euclid Analytics monitoring system.104 At present, the only way
consumers who own cell phones can defend themselves against being tracked as
they shop is to turn off their cell phones, 05 or to create bad publicity for
retailers who use tracking technology. Nordstrom recently abandoned its
customer tracking days after it became public, demonstrating that public
100 See id. at 8 ("Our Goal" is "an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information
and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce,
strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation. To achieve
that goal, we will build and sustain an environment in which norms of responsible behavior
guide states' actions, sustain partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace."
(emphasis omitted)).
1011d. at 10.
102 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking speaks only of safety and research. See Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg. 74144, 74145
(proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) ("to improve crash and defect
investigation and crash data collection quality to assist safety researchers, vehicle
manufacturers, and the agency to understand vehicle crashes better and more precisely").
103 See supra text accompanying note 76.
104 See Angela Martin, Nordstrom Using Smart Phones To Track Customers
Movements, CBS DFW (May 7, 2013, 10:05 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/07/
nordstrom-using-smart-phones-to-track-customers-movements/; see also Quentin Hardy,
Technology Turns to Tracking People Offline, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Mar. 7, 2013, 2:52
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/technology-tums-to-tracking-people-offline/
(reporting that Euclid has used fifty million customers' smart phones in 4,000 locations to
monitor "how many people are coming into a store, how long they stay and even which
aisles they walk").
105 See Martin, supra note 104.
2013]1 985
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
information about the use of monitoring technology will deter its use in at least
some cases. 106
Online, the choices are especially stark. Even if it is the case that the NSA
is collecting all user meta-data for Internet and telephone calls, and also
retaining copies of many or all communications,10 7 users of telephones and
computers still have an interest in protecting themselves from non-
governmental parties who would like to know things about them. This is
increasingly difficult, and in some environments pretty near impossible. To
begin with, the architecture of the Internet makes certain types of identification
routine. Every Internet communication requires an Internet Protocol (IP)
number. 08 While in some cases it is possible to mask this number when
sending data, anyone hoping to receive information must provide an accurate
and unique IP address or that information will not be received.109 If, as is pretty
much always the case, IP numbers are permanent or, when shared, ISPs and
other intermediaries keep records of who has which IP number at what time, the
IP number becomes a way of identifying most speakers and almost all
listeners.110 "Almost all" because it is possible, with some effort, to mask one's
identity with the help of an intermediary. Even without the cooperation of the
sender's ISP, the very IP number itself usually discloses important geo-location
information about the sender."1
We have seen how Ixquick offers this masking service in the search engine
market; cognate proxy services exist for the web and for email, but they add
complexity and usually noticeable delay to any Internet usage.11 2 While Tor and
other proxy services do not protect against wiretaps and other forms of
observation at the customer's ISP, they do anonymize the user as regards the
party on the other end of the communication.11 3 At present there are no U.S.
legal restrictions on the use of these proxies, just practical ones.
106 See Angela Martin, Nordstrom No Longer Tracking Customer Phones, CBS DFW
(May 9, 2013, 10:43 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/09/nordstrom-no-longer-track
ing-customer-smart-phones/.
107 See supra note 46.
I08 See Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion
of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J 567, 594 (2012).
109 See id.
110 See id at 595.
Ill See id. at 596-99.
l2 See, e.g., Prithula Dhungel et al., Waiting for Anonymity: Understanding Delays in
Tor, at pt. 1 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://cis.poly.edu/-ross/papers/Tor.pdf.
But see Roger Dingledine & Steven J. Murdoch, Performance Improvements on Tor or, Why
Tor Is Slow and What We're Going To Do About It, TOR BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009),
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03- 11 -performance.pdf.
113 Dingledine & Murdoch, supra note 112, at 1.
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D. Other Side Effects
Many laws which exist, and often long have existed, for legitimate social
purposes have the unintentional effect of making the deployments of modem
PETs difficult or impossible. This section provides a small number of
representative examples.
On August 6, 2013, the Board of Deer Trail Colorado considered a
symbolic ordinance that would have created "drone hunting licenses" and
bounties for shooting unmanned drones.1 4 The Board split 3-3, meaning that
the issue will be put to a referendum this November. 15 Leaving aside
Supremacy Clause issues (the ordinance was aimed at federally owned and
operated unmanned air vehicles), the inspiration for the proposed ordinance
illustrates a key difficulty facing most self-help measures against surveillance:
any defensive action that damages a legally emplaced surveillance device,116
whether public or private, is likely both illegal and tortious primarily due to
criminal and property rules that exist to regulate conduct which has nothing to
do with privacy. As the law now stands-that is, in the absence of unlikely new
enabling legislation-only purely passive defenses against surveillance, and not
even all of these, are likely to be legal.117
114 The ordinance states, in part,
The Town of Deer Trail shall issue a reward of $100 to any shooter who presents a
valid hunting license and .. . identifiable parts of an unmanned aerial vehicle whose
markings and configuration are consistent with those used on any similar craft known to
be owned or operated by the United States federal government.
Amanda Kost, Deer Trail Town Board Has Tie Vote on Drone-Hunting Proposal, Sending
Issue to Town To Vote in Nov., ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.thedenver
channel.com/news/local-news/town-board-in-tiny-deer-trail-colo-votes-tonight-on-proposed-
drone-hunting-licences-bounties.
115Id
116 The legality of low-altitude drone flights over private property likely turns in the first
instance on the applicability and reach of FAA regulations. See generally Timothy M.
Ravich, The Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the National Airspace, 85 N.D. L.
REv. 597 (2009) (surveying issues about application and validity of current FAA rules as
applied to drones). Absent a regulatory permission, a drone flying low over private property
would constitute a trespass. See Alexis C. Madrigal, If I Fly a UA V over My Neighbor's
House, Is It Trespassing?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/1 0/if-i-fly-a-uav-over-my-neighbors-house-is-it-trespassing/263
431/.
117 Fear of drone overflights has spurred legislation in at least seven states: Florida, see
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, ch. 2013-33, 2013 Fla. Laws 33 (no right to
self-help; an aggrieved party may seek injunctive or pecuniary relief); Idaho, see Act of Apr.
11, 2013, ch. 328, 2013 Idaho Sess. Laws 328 (no right to self-help; an aggrieved party may
seek injunctive or pecuniary relief); Illinois, see Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act,
2013 Ill. Pub. Act 98-0569 (no right to self-help), Act of Aug. 16, 2013, 2013 Ill. Pub. Act
98-0402 (criminalizing use of drones to interfere with another's lawful taking of wildlife or
aquatic life); Montana, see Act of May 1, 2013, ch. 377, 2013 Mont. Laws 377 (no right to
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Consider, for example, the "Camera Zapper," a laser-based system designed
to blind surveillance cameras. 118 Even assuming that the zapper's laser did not
itself violate any local ordinances, it surely would be a tort to damage the
camera in any way. Permanent damage would be conversion; temporary harm
would be trespass to chattel. Depending on the jurisdiction, the same acts might
be considered vandalism, criminal mischief, criminal trespass or various other
crimes or violations. These tort and criminal rules exist for valid reasons having
nothing to do with PETs, but their existence means that a variety of (perhaps
slightly exotic) privacy self-help techniques are unavailable to the law-abiding
citizen.
In some cases, it may be illegal to attempt to foil the cameras even
passively. It is usually illegal to obscure one's license plate, leaving cars
vulnerable to an extensive network of automated license-plate monitors.1 19
Several states have statutes prohibiting the wearing of masks in public areas, 120
and federal law prohibits wearing masks for certain purposes.12 1 State anti-mask
laws arose primarily in response to the actions of the Ku Klux Klan. 122 These
laws have survived many challenges.1 23 Employees who seek to block
self-help); Tennessee, see Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, ch. 470, 2013 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 470 (no right to self-help; an aggrieved party may seek injunctive or pecuniary
relief); Texas, see Texas Privacy Act, ch. 1390, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1390 (no right to self-
help; an aggrieved party may seek injunctive or pecuniary relief; various privacy invasions
are criminalized); Virginia, see Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 755, 2013 Va. Acts 755 (no right to
self-help).
118 For details see NAIMARK, supra note 48.
119 For example, Virginia forbids mounting anything around a license plate that alters or
obscures it. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-716 (2013). Similarly, Pennsylvania law states that "[i]t
is unlawful to display on any vehicle a registration plate which: ... (2) is obscured in any
manner which inhibits the proper operation of an automated red light enforcement
system . . ; (3) is otherwise illegible at a reasonable distance or is obscured in any manner."
75 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 1332 (2012). On license plate monitors, see generally
CATHERINE CRUMP ET AL., ACLU, You ARE BEING TRACKED: How LICENSE PLATE
READERS ARE BEING USED To RECORD AMERICANS' MOVEMENTS 13-16 (July 17, 2013),
available at http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-
plate-readers-are-being-used-record (noting millions of records being retained indefinitely).
120For a full survey see Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies:
Applying Anti-mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 848-49 (2013). These statutes generally bar the donning of any
facial covering that alters the appearance of the wearer, making him unidentifiable or
causing fear or intimidation in other persons. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1301
(2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 2013).
12142 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012) (creating cause of action "[i]f two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another,
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws").
122 See Kaminski, supra note 120, at 848.
12 3 See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 208 (2d
Cir. 2004) (upholding New York anti-mask law against First Amendment challenge); West
Virginia v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 514 (W. Va. 1996) (finding a legitimate government
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employer-installed GPS trackers may face tens of thousands of dollars in fines
for interfering with other legitimate GPS-based systems.124
Perhaps the most notorious set of legal rules that served to block PETs were
the United States' longstanding restrictions on the exportation of cryptographic
software and hardware. Although it was legal to use strong cryptography in the
United States, export of strong encryption was for many years a serious
offense.125 As a result, major firms such as Microsoft chose not to build strong
cryptography into email and word processing programs because that would
have required them to produce different versions for the U.S. and non-U.S.
markets. 126 Not only would this have required maintaining a more complex
codebase, but the firms feared that non-U.S. customers would, with some
reason, feel like they were being sold a second-class product. The U.S.
government eventually relaxed its cryptography regulations somewhat, but only
after a long rearguard action designed to prevent the spread of strong(ish)
cryptography as long as possible. 127 That side effect may have originally been
unintentional, but the U.S. government certainly took full advantage of it for
many years.
Furthermore, the side-effect problem is not limited to existing rules.
Proposed solutions to technology-based social problems can create new anti-
PET side effects. For example, some public officials have called on cell phone
manufacturers to make cell phone theft more difficult by making it impossible
to change the cell phone's unique identifier, the International Mobile Station
Equipment Identity (IMEI).128 Blocking IMEI masking would make it harder to
hide cell phone theft, but do so at the cost of preventing users from changing the
IMEI to baffle any tracking operation relying on it.129 (Users also may want to
change an IMEI in order to sell a cell phone as some carriers would otherwise
attempt to block the sale or refuse to route calls to the phone after it changed
hands.)
interest in the protection of citizens from the violence, fear, and intimidation of being
confronted by someone whom they cannot identify).
12 4 See N.J. Man in a Jam, After Illegal GPS Device Interferes with Newark Liberty
Operations, CBS2 NEW YoRK (Aug. 9, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/
2013/08/09/n-j-man-in-a-jam-after-illegal-gps-device-interferes-with-newark-liberty-operati
ons/ (reporting FAA fined employee of construction company $32,000 for his use of $100
GPS-blocker he intended "to hide his movements from his boss" but which interfered with
test of new airport GPS system).
12 5 See Froomkin, Planet Clipper, supra note 72, at 18-20.126 See id.
12 7 See id. at 748-51; Froomkin, Metaphor, supra note 72, at 21-23.
128 See Brian X. Chen & Malia Wollan, Cellphone Thefts Grow, but the Industry Looks
the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/technology/
cellphone-thefts-grow-but-the-industry-looks-the-other-way.html (quoting George Gasc6n,
San Francisco's district attorney, as saying, "Unlike other types of crimes, this is a crime that
could be easily fixed with a technological solution").
129 See id. (quoting Electronic Frontier Foundation Senior Staff Technologist Seth
Schoen who described the right to change the identification as a "pro-privacy measure").
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IV. CONCLUSION: BE NICE TO PETs
Given the increasing number of ways in which privacy is under assault,
given the increase of ID theft, and given the conventional wisdom that
consumers are responsible for securing their privacy themselves, one might
reasonably expect that U.S. industry and the U.S. government would encourage
the development and deployment of both PETs and PPTs-particularly as other
forms of self-help privacy protection, notably changes in habits or attempts to
secure contractual privacy protections, seem so unlikely to be effective.130
Unfortunately, the truth is much closer to the reverse: a plethora of commercial
practices and legal rules discourage privacy-protective technologies, or even
make them illegal. Many, perhaps most, of these rules were not designed with
PETs in mind; rather, they serve some other goal, and the obstacle to PPT
deployment and use is a side-effect, incidental damage. The cumulative effect
of these disparate policies, however, is to create a climate in which PET use
remains difficult-and thus stunted. In the United States, a combination of
public and private efforts have made it unnecessarily difficult, and in some
cases risky, illegal, or even impossible, for consumers to install and use a wide
variety of defenses to both online and offline surveillance.
As visible surveillance grows, and especially as we learn more and more
about the invisible surveillance to which we daily are subjected-with or
without the approval of a secret court-we more urgently need laws that default
to privacy, or at least make it practicable for people to choose a privacy option.
Instead of being nurtured and encouraged, too often privacy-enhancing
technology is discouraged, or PETs are not allowed, or worse their use is
criminalized. Instead of putting PETs on a leash, we should say, "PETs
Welcome!"
V. UPDATE: RETHINKING PETs AFTER SNOWDEN
As this Article went to press, reporters working with former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden continued to release new information describing the NSA's
systematic subversion of encryption and other privacy enhancing technologies.
One might therefore ask how many of the various obstacles to the
deployment of PETs and other privacy protective technologies described in this
Article are not, as is sometimes suggested above, the result of malign
coincidence or collateral damage from an over-aggressive focus on some other
objective, but rather part of a plan to systematically neuter PETs and make
computer (and cellphone) aided communication and storage a privacy-free
zone, at least as regards U.S. government monitoring.
130 A fourth option would be national privacy legislation; however, even in a more
privacy-friendly regulatory climate, there likely would remain people who would choose to
employ PETs for additional privacy and security-if the PETs were available and legal.
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We now have evidence that a covert element of the U.S. government, the
NSA, ran a program approved at high levels that consciously subverted key
encryption technologies and bypassed others in order to make it as difficult as
possible for U.S. residents to protect their informational privacy. Evidence has
now emerged that the NSA quietly introduced vulnerabilities known only to it
in international cryptography standards intended for the Internet and for
smartphones.
Beginning in 2000, as encryption tools were gradually blanketing the
Web, the N.S.A. invested billions of dollars in a clandestine campaign to
preserve its ability to eavesdrop. Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to
insert its own 'back door' in all encryption, it set out to accomplish the same
goal by stealth. 131
Meanwhile, acting both with and without the consent of major software
manufacturers, the NSA introduced secret back doors into widely-used
commercial software. Specifically,
companies say they were coerced by the government into handing over their
master encryption keys or building in a back door. And the agency used its
influence as the world's most experienced code maker to covertly introduce
weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by hardware and software
developers around the world. 132
The result is to substantially undermine PETs on which millions of U.S.
residents rely daily including Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) used for an
increasing fraction of World Wide Web access, virtual private networks
(VPNs), and the encryption standard used on fourth-generation, or 4G,
smartphones.133
Similarly, the NSA induced key Internet communications intermediaries to
give the NSA back door access to users' communications, most commonly
meaning that the NSA could copy pre-encrypted text. Among the companies
reported to have cooperated was Microsoft, for email systems Outlook and
Hotmail, video conference system Skype, and cloud storage system
SkyDrive.134 Apple,135 Google, Yahoo, and Facebook were also targeted.136 As
131 Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shan, N.S.A. Able To Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-
foils-much-internet-encryption.html?pagewanted=all.
'
32Id.
1 3 3 Id.
134 See Glenn Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted
Messages, GUARDIAN, July 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/1 1/micro
soft-nsa-collaboration-user-data.
135 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of
Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
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a result, the NSA (and the UK's GCHQ) could in effect circumvent even the
strong encryption systems that it had not managed to undermine. The NSA
therefore had systematic access to the private files of most Internet users,
including their private bank and medical records.137
Indeed, in leaked internal documents the NSA boasted of its Digital
Network Intelligence, including a system called XKeyscore, the NSA's "widest
reaching" system.138 XKeyscore, one document claimed, covers "nearly
everything a typical user does on the [I]nternet, including the content of emails,
websites visited and searches," metadata, and even social media such as
Facebook chats or private messages.139 What is more, XKeyscore, the
documents state, can give the NSA (or its contractors) access to both stored and
real time data.140
The evidence of compromise of some widely-used standards is so
compelling that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the
U.S. government's standards agency charged with recommending secure
protocols for encryption, has recommended against using its own standard for
"Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation," and re-opened the
period for public comment on it and two other standards that may have been
compromised.141 The same vulnerability compromised the default
implementation of RSA, one of the most commonly used commercial
encryption standards, and after the publicity the company issued an advisory to
developer customers on how to work around it.142
In light of these revelations, it becomes harder and harder to disagree with
John Gilmore, who after describing various problems with the troubled IPSEC
online encryption standard recently concluded that,
To this day, no mobile telephone standards committee has considered or
adopted any end-to-end (phone-to-phone) privacy protocols. This is because
the big companies involved, huge telcos, are all in bed with NSA to make
136 See James Ball et al., Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet
Privacy and Security, GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security.
137Id.; see also Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 1071 (2013).
138 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects "Nearly Everything a User
Does on the Internet," GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jul/3 1/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
139 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Id.
141 U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SUPPLEMENTAL
ITL BULLETIN FOR SEPTEMBER 2013 (2013), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
nistbul/itlbul2013 09 supplemental.pdf.
I42 See Kim Zetter, RSA Tells Its Developer Customers: Stop Using NSA-Linked
Algorithm, WIRED (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/
rsa-advisory-nsa-algorithm/.
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damn sure that working end-to-end encryption never becomes the default on
mobile phones. 143
Whether or not Gilmore is correct as to the intent of the various actors,
there now seems little doubt that any prudent person must assume that many if
not all of the most commonly used Internet communications tools-and also the
most commonly used Internet security and encryption tools-have back doors
or work-arounds known to the U.S. government, the UK government, and
possibly other governments also. 144 It is a truism of security research that if a
product has a back door, in time the means of access will either leak or be
independently discovered by third parties, including criminals; this is part of the
reason why the introduction of even very secret back doors is considered to
severely compromise security software.145
At present it seems no security technology can be trusted.146 There is even a
suggestion that the NSA may have put vulnerabilities into critical security
hardware, sabotaging microchip production so as to insert back doors into
random number generators, using a process that is almost impossible to detect
once the chips have left the factory. 147
The natural result of these revelations is a high degree of concern all over
the world. For example, reports suggested the German Government feared,
143 John Gilmore, Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on
"BULLRUN," MAIL ARCHIVE (Sept. 6, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://www.mail-archive.com/
cryptography@metzdowd.com/msgl2325.html (message board posting).
144 C( Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Shares Raw
Intelligence Including Americans' Data with Israel, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/ 1/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-
documents. The article reports the sharing of raw intelligence, not the secret means by which
it was gathered. Raw intelligence, however, will contain markers that make clear its origins
as an email, a chat, or whatever. While this sharing does not immediately allow the receiving
agency to acquire the capacity to acquire private communications, it will over time permit
the receiving agency to deduce what types of Internet communications have been
compromised and to focus their efforts on replicating the exploit.
14 5 See, e.g., The Economist, NSA Subversion ofInternet Security: Bad for the US, Good
for Criminals, GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2013/sep/20/nsa-subversion-intemet-security-economist (noting that "the NSA's
actions may have weakened overall internet security, on which billions of people rely for
banking and payments, with backdoors that can be exploited by criminals, not just
intelligence agencies").
146 See, e.g., Did the NSA Subvert the Security of lPv6?, INFoSECURITY (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/34405/did-the-nsa-subvert-the-security-of-
ipv6/ ("The bottom line, however, is that the fabric of the internet can no longer be
trusted.").
147 See Bruce Schneier, Surreptitiously Tampering with Computer Chips, SCHNEIER ON
SECURITY BLOG (Sept. 16, 2013, 1:25 PM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/
09/surreptitiously.html (citing Georg T. Becker et al., Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware
Trojans, in WORKsHOP ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE AND EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 197
(2013), available at http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChesl3.pdf).
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reasonably enough, that the DRM in Windows 8 might be "a Trojan Horse for
the NSA." 48 The level of security malaise--one hesitates to label as "paranoia"
something that might well be justified-has become so pervasive that when the
Russian Guard Service ordered new typewriters, this was widely, if perhaps
inaccurately, reported as a decision to switch to paper for its most sensitive
information because no electronic device could henceforth be trusted.149
In the end it may matter less whether the current poor U.S. legal
environment for PETs and other privacy protective technologies is mostly the
result of a series of accidents or primarily the consequence of a careful plan
supporting the surveillance interests of the NSA and other U.S. surveillance
agencies. The bottom line is much the same: if the United States has any interest
in giving life to its rhetoric of personal responsibility for data securityo50 then
U.S. law must be changed to become far more PET-friendly.
The NSA surveillance program was highly clandestine. Many of the people
involved at the state and federal level in policy-making relating to personal
security likely were not aware of the NSA's activities before the Snowden
revelations. That was then: we are all on notice now. The question now that we
are on notice is whether policy makers will act to halt programs designed to
undermine encryption and other security or privacy-protective technologies.
Rather than just treating PETs as an unfortunate and regretted casualty of other
worthy objectives, the U.S. government has now been shown to be acting as if
PETs were a menace to the needs of a security establishment that wants access
to all personal communications, and all private data, all the time.
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology has stepped up to
the plate and is revising its compromised standards.' 5 ' The Internet Engineering
Task Force, a private international standards body, is considering new more
robust Internet security standards.152 U.S. legislators and regulators need to
display a similar respect for information privacy or PETs will remain the
functional equivalent of roadkill.
14 8 John E. Dunn, Is Windows 8 a Trojan Horse for the NSA? The German Government
Thinks So, TECHWORLD (Aug 22, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://news.techworld.com/security/
3465259/is-windows-8-a-trojan-horse-for-the-nsa-the-german-government-thinks-so/.
Subsequently, however, the German Government "published a statement significantly
downplaying the claims ... referring merely to worries over a potential technical loss of
control." Id.
14 9 See Miriam Elder, Russian Guard Service Reverts to Typewriters After NSA Leaks,
GUARDIAN, July 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-
paper-nsa-leaks. Later reports suggested that the use of typewriters as an information
security practice was in fact long-standing, and the order was just to replace aging machines
currently in use. Kremlin's Order of Old-Fashioned Typewriters Sparks Media Frenzy, RT
(July 12, 2013, 1:05 AM), http://rt.com/news/typewriters-russia-order-surveillance-975/.
15 0 See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
151 See supra text accompanying note 141.
152 See Phillip Hallam-Baker, PRISM-Proof Security Considerations (Sept. 11, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-
req-00.txt.
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